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At its heart, the Northern Ireland problem concerns the constitu-
tional and political fate of territory in dispute between the Irish and
British states. Reluctantly but from necessity, the two governments
must now face the implications of that fact. If there has been any pro-
gress during the last decade of violence, it has come in the form of a
better understanding of the political and constitutional issues by both
governments and peoples. No longer is the situation presented as ex-
clusively one of archaic religious animosity between Protestants and
Catholics still fighting the religious wars of the seventeenth century.
Nor do the psychological theories that interpret community divisions
between majority and minority as simple prejudice enjoy the currency
they once did. The problem is now correctly interpreted as a highly
complex conflict of identities and nationalisms which implicates both
states in its genesis and in its possible resolution.'
It is difficult to decide whether the economic crisis or the political
crisis is more acute in Ireland today. The economy of Northern Ireland
is feared by many to be in irreversible decline due to the combined
effects of the political violence and worldwide economic recession.
2
The economy of the Republic of Ireland is also in serious difficulty due
to large external debt and rising unemployment. Recession is some-
thing the island shares with the rest of the world and, with the rest of
the world, Ireland hopes for economic improvement. However, North-
ern Ireland's post-colonial political crisis is a unique burden which per-
mits little optimism. Since the Irish "troubles" entered a violent phase
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1. This definition of the problem underlies the latest British policy document. See
NORTHERN IRELAND: A FRAMEWORK FOR DEVOLUTION, CMD. 5, No. 8541 (1982).
2. For detailed economic assessments and forecasts, see THE NORTHERN IRELAND
ECONOMY: THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS (Coopers & Lybrand As-
socs. 1982) and ECONOMIC SCENARIOS TO 1990: TECHNICAL APPENDICES (Coopers &
Lybrand Assocs. 1982). See also R. HUTCHINSON & J. SHEEHAN, A REVIEW OF SELECTED
INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE REPUBLIC OF
IRELAND DURING THE 1970's (1980); ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN IRELAND (N. Gibson & J.
Spencer eds. 1977); Gibson, Political andEconomic Integration, in POLITICAL COOPERATION
IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 97 (D. Rea ed. 1977).
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over a decade ago, 2,000 people have died in Northern Ireland and
property destruction has been enormous.3
In a conflict as protracted as that in Northern Ireland, human rights
concerns can no longer be treated separately from the issue of the polit-
ical fate of the territory. The safeguarding of human rights requires a
stable political process, and a political structure can only endure if it is
consciously built around respect for the rights of individuals and
minorities.
Northern Ireland has never been an effective political democracy
and little time remains to make it one. The alternative is a widening of
the violence and the extraordinary prospect of a civil war in a part of
Western Europe in the last decades of the twentieth century.
The purpose of this paper is not to account for the Northern Ireland
conflict or to propose particular resolutions.4 Its more limited purpose
is to isolate and comment upon those features of the Northern Ireland
experience relevant to the protection of human rights by law in condi-
tions of serious internal strife.5 The paper first examines the concept of
an "emergency" in international law and its application to the situation
in Northern Ireland. The contrasting roles played by international ju-
dicial bodies and the domestic common law courts have been a major
feature of the emergency. The paper then considers the impact of se-
curity measures on human rights. Interrogation powers, the political
status of detainees, and the use of lethal force by security officers are
explored as examples of infringement of human rights during the
emergency.
I. Emergency Conditions in Northern Ireland
An incontestable emergency continues in Northern Ireland. The
I.R.A. has declared its aim of forcing a British withdrawal and over-
throwing the Republic's Government. Loyalist paramilitary groups re-
3. For general accounts of the period, see K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, LAW
AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1975) [hereinafter LAW AND STATE]; SUN-
DAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, ULSTER (1975); J. DARBY, CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLARISED COMMUNITY (1976); Palley, The Evolution, Disintegra-
tion and Possible Reconstruction of the Northern Ireland Constitution, I ANGLO-AM. L. REV.
368 (1972).
4. See, e.g., R. ROSE, GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: AN IRISH PERSPECTIVE
(1971); Whyte, Interpretations of the Northern Ireland Problem- An Appraisal, 9 ECON. &
Soc. REV. 257 (1978); N. MANSERGH, THE IRISH QUESTION, 1840-1921 (rev. ed. 1965); H.
CALVERT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1978).
5. See LAW AND STATE, supra note 3; see also K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD,
TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1980) [hereinafter TEN YEARS ON]. The conflict
has been reported on regularly by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and by the
U.K. National Council for Civil Liberties.
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act violently against Catholic citizens and their property. The cycle of
alternative crisis and stalemate in the political process has exacerbated
the situation and allowed violence to flourish.
When armed and clandestine groups announce a policy of attacking
and destroying the existing state, the authorities can claim title to spe-
cial measures of defense. One consequence is the abrogation of the
rights normally enjoyed by citizens. It would be utopian to expect that
all abuses of human rights can be avoided in an emergency. Neverthe-
less, for a democratic government under real conditions of emergency,
the concern is to prevent disproportionate reactions and to minimize
the risk that officials and security forces will react to increased powers
by excessive and illegal actions with the expectation that they will not
be brought to account. The experience of the last decade in Ulster,
even with a democratic government such as Britain's, underlines how
difficult it is to ensure such objectives.
Under very difficult conditions both the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland have demonstrated at least some commitment to
legality. There has not been a policy of wholesale abuse of emergency
powers. The powers granted do not allow the suppression of freedom
of speech and the imprisonment of the opposition in either state. In-
deed, in Northern Ireland in particular, the powers granted are note-
worthy for their narrow scope; they require renewal by Parliament
semiannually or yearly; and their exercise can be questioned in the leg-
islature and by a free press. The British government has established a
Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights in Northern Ireland
which, over the years, has pointed to many of the deficiencies men-
tioned here, and also attempts to monitor the functioning of the excep-
tional measures on a continuous basis. Above all, the governments
have submitted to international review at a time when it might be ex-
pected that state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction would be
asserted.
The interplay of international scrutiny and the involvement of mu-
nicipal courts has helped limit the abuses of human rights under the
emergency. At the same time, the judicial scrutiny possible under in-
ternational law and through international bodies illustrates the rela-
tively marginal role of the common law courts under national security
measures.
A. International Scrutiny
Since Britain became one of the founding signatories of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, the conflict in Northern Ireland
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has been almost continuously on the agendas of the organs of the Con-
vention. Among the first derogations from the Convention was a notice
from the United Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland. The deroga-
tion first notified in 1957 has never been withdrawn. Northern Ireland
thus has been formally treated as subject to a public emergency and
excluded from one or other of the Convention's major protections due
to a "public emergency affecting the life of the nation" over the effec-
tive life of the Convention. 6
The jurisprudence of the Commission and Court of Human Rights
has established the following characteristics of an emergency where ar-
ticle 15 of the Convention is invoked: (i) the emergency must be actual
or imminent; (ii) its effects must involve the whole nation; (iii) the con-
tinuance of the organized life of the community must be threatened;
and (iv) the crisis or danger must be exceptional in that the normal
measures or restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the mainte-
nance of public safety, health, and order, are plainly inadequate.7
It does not follow, however, that the proclamation of a public emer-
gency either absolves governments from all their obligations under the
Convention or removes the element of international supervision. It is
clear from the jurisprudence of the Convention that the Commission
and Court consider themselves empowered to review the entitlement of
a state to derogate from protected rights in the first place and to deter-
mine, given that derogation is justifiable, whether the state has taken
such measures only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation." The emergency in Northern Ireland therefore has not
prevented important proceedings under the Convention.8
Article 15 of the Convention also limits the state's powers in an
emergency through the concept of non-derogable rights. Thus, article 3
(prohibition on torture), article 4 (forced labor), article 7 (retroactive
penal law), article 14 (discrimination), and article 2 (the right to life
except "in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war") may not
be derogated from in any circumstances. In comparison with other sit-
uations in the world in which national security laws are deployed, the
6. The texts of the notices of derogation are gathered in STANDING ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY LAW IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND, CMD. 5, No. 7009 (1977) [hereinafter PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS].
7. Lawless Case, 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 492 (Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights); Regina v. Deery, 1977 N. Ir. 164, 166 (1977); see also Buergenthal, To Re-
spect and To Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (L. Henkin ed. 1981).
8. Boyle & Hannum, Ireland in Strasbourg: An Anaysis of Northern Irish Proceedings
Before the European Commission of Human Rights, 7 IR. JUR. 329 (1976).
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degree of effective scrutiny of such exceptional measures possible under
the Convention is remarkable. But one equally remarkable feature in
the United Kingdom's case is the contrast between acceptance of inter-
national judicial review and the domestic reality of judicial subordina-
tion. However valuable international complaints, procedures, and
adjudications may be, they cannot substitute for the protection offered
by a national judicial system, particularly where the government re-
sorts to far-reaching powers.
B. Common Law Impotence under Emergency Conditions
Political division and emergency conditions have demonstrated the
inadequacy of the common law courts as protectors of human rights
during times of tumult and conflict. Particularly striking is the total
inadequacy of the law in providing remedies for grievances of malad-
ministration and injustice. One example illustrates the general pattern
of common law inadequacy.
In 1965, following the introduction of legal aid in Northern Ireland,
an application for legal aid to challenge discrimination in housing by a
local council was made to the Legal Aid Committee on behalf of the
Campaign for Social Justice. That Committee, in a decision confirmed
by the Appeal Aid Committee, refused legal aid because the applica-
tion did not disclose a cause of action with the reasonable chance of
success necessary to justify expenditure of public funds. 9 This ap-
proach characterized the legal advice given over the next few years to
groups wishing to use the law for remedying grievances. It has been
argued that the position as to legal remedies was not as bad as advised,
and that a successful challenge to the discriminatory practices might
have been pursued under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920.10
Perhaps due to a combination of legal conservatism on the part of the
bar and reluctance by minority groups to persist in their attempts, chal-
lenges through legal processes brought few limitations to abuses of
power in Northern Ireland.
Hindsight shows that Northern Ireland was the wrong place to rely
on the traditional English assumption that abuses of power could be
left to common law and common sense. The theory of parliamentary
sovereignty conflicts with the concept of fundamental or inalienable
rights that are subject to judicial protection. This conflict becomes
acute under emergency conditions. As Lord Scarman commented:
9. LAW AND STATE, supra note 3, at 11-12.
10. Palley, supra note 3, at 383-96.
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When times are normal and fear is not stalking the land, English law
sturdily protects the freedom of the individual and respects human per-
sonality. But when times are abnormally alive with fear and prejudice,
the common law is at a disadvantage: it cannot resist the will however
frightened and prejudiced it may be, of Parliament. . . . It is the help-
lessness of the law in the face of the legislative sovereignty of Parliament
which makes it difficult for the legal system to accommodate the concept
of fundamental and inviolable human rights. 1
The final court of appeal for Northern Ireland, the House of Lords,
has proved Lord Scarman's contention by its actions during the emer-
gency. MeEldowney v. Forde12 was one of the few legal challenges to
Northern Ireland's code of emergency powers to come before the
House of Lords. The case challenged the Civil Authorities (Special
Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922,13 a permanent code of excep-
tionally wide executive powers that had been passed by the Northern
Ireland Parliament. The Act gave the executive unfettered discretion
over detention without trial, house arrest, expulsion, and the banning
of organizations, publications, and public meetings. In McEldowney v.
Forde the appellant had been prosecuted for breach of a regulation
proscribing membership in a political organization, a republican club.14
The appellant challenged the order as void under the Act, claiming that
it was impermissibly broad and arbitrary in its scope, and that it ex-
ceeded the power granted by the Act. 15 The majority upheld the regu-
lation, reasoning that, in the absence of bad faith, which had not been
alleged, the Minister of Home Affairs alone could decide on the subver-
sive nature of any organization and the necessity of its proscription.
Lord Pearson commented:
The Northern Ireland Parliament must have intended that somebody
should decide whether or not the making of some proposed regulation
would be conducive to "preservation of the peace and maintenance of
order." Obviously it must have been intended that the Minister of Home
Affairs could decide the question. Who else could? . . . The Courts can-
not have been intended to decide such a question because they do not
have the necessary information and the decision is in the sphere of poli-
tics, which is not their sphere.
16
11. ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION 15 (1974). For an important critique of
human rights protections under English constitutional law, see Lester, FundamentalfRihts in
the United Kingdom, 125 PENN. L. REv. 337 (1976).
12. [1969] 2 All E.R. 1039.
13. N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 5, repealedby the Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act, 1973, ch. 53, § 31(2).
14. [1969] 2 All E.R. at 1041.
15. Id at 1044.
16. Id at 1066.
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This approach of the common law courts contrasts sharply with the
approach of the European Commission and the Human Rights Court.
The question raised in McEldowney v. Forde would have been within
the competence of the European Commission and Court, as it directly
raised the rights to freedom of speech and association under articles 10
and 11 of the Convention. The articles permit limitations on these
rights; nevertheless, the organs of the Convention are empowered to
decide if a limitation, including as in this case the removal from oppo-
nents of a government of all right to organize politically, would be jus-
tified in a democratic society.
It would be inaccurate to conclude that the judiciary, particularly in
the local courts, has not attempted to protect and defend individual
citizens. In a number of important decisions the courts have criticized
the security authorities or declared their actions illegal.' 7 All these de-
cisions, however, were subsequently reversed legislatively by Parlia-
ment. A typical example was Regina (Hume and Others) v.
Londonderry Justices.'8 The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal held
that the powers to disperse assemblies given to soldiers under the Spe-
cial Powers Act of 1922 were invalid because they had been conferred
under a Northern Ireland statute and constituted legislation "in respect
of" the military which was outside the competence of the Parliament of
Northern Ireland, under its constitution, the Government of Ireland
Act of 1920. Within twenty-four hours the Westminster Parliament re-
versed this decision. The Northern Ireland Act of 1972 confirmed the
entitlement of the army to act under the local statutory powers and
retroactively validated all earlier arrests by soldiers. 19 This is not to
suggest that some legislation was not necessary in the wake of the deci-
sion. Legislation directly empowering the soldiers to exercise law en-
forcement powers might have been passed, however, without reversing
the judicial decision. 20 Instant reversal of decisions hardly encourages
the courts to play a meaningful role in supervising the operation of
emergency powers.
In a series of important decisions prior to 1973 the Northern Ireland
courts had made clear that the ordinary rules governing admissibility
of evidence at common law in a criminal trial applied to politically
motivated offenses. Under these common law rules the prosecution
17. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at paras. 2.11 & 2.19; LAW AND
STATE, supra note 2, at 119-37.
18. 1972 N. Ir. 91.
19. See THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 3, at 280-310.
20. This was done the following year in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act, 1973.
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carried the burden of proving that any statements or admissions by de-
fendants were voluntary. In particular, the courts had held that the
subjection of persons to interrogation for long periods, even if no alle-
gations of physical ill-treatment were made, would render a statement
inadmissible because it tended to sap the will of the person ques-
tioned.21 In 1973 the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Northern
Ireland Emergency Provisions Act, which replaced the common law
rules with evidentiary rules more favorable to the prosecution.
These examples illustrate an undoubted policy of marginalizing the
judiciary throughout the conflict. When this policy is considered in
light of the subordinate role that judicial power plays under the British
constitution, the possibility of ensuring effective safeguards against
abuse of emergency powers must be deemed remote.
22
II. National Security Measures and Human Rights
The major features of government response to the violence in North-
ern Ireland have been: (a) the large-scale deployment of military force;
(b) the granting of additional law enforcement powers to both army
and police; (c) the use of internment or detention without trial; (d) the
modification of ordinary criminal procedure for the trial of those sus-
pected of involvement in the violence; and (e) the taking of special ex-
ecutive powers applicable in Britain and in Northern Ireland, including
powers to detain and deport individuals and power to proscribe
organizations.
These national security measures have been implemented through
the enactment of statutes specifically designed to deal with the crisis,
among the most recent of which have been the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978 and the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976.23 The former ultimately derived
from the recommendations of a commission chaired by Lord Diplock
in 197224 and reviewed in 1974 by a committee chaired by Lord Gar-
diner and charged "to consider, in the context of civil liberties and
human rights, measures to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland. '' 25
21. See Regina v. Corr, 1968 N. Ir. L.R. 193, 221 (C.C.A.).
22. Rose, On the Priorities of Citizensh#p in the Deep South and Northern Ireland, 38 J. OF
POL. 247 (1976); see also LAW AND STATE, supra note 3, at 9-28.
23. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5; Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, ch. 8.
24. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURE TO DEAL WITH TER-
RORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD. 5, No. 5185 (1972) (Lord Diplock, Chair-
man) [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT].
25. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
The conclusion of the Diplock Commission, endorsed with reluc-
tance two years later by the Gardiner Committee, was that the charac-
ter and scale of terrorism in Northern Ireland made detention without
trial a legitimate response by the State.26 Nevertheless, the basic policy
advocated by both groups was that in so far as possible the ordinary
criminal law ought to be used in combatting terrorism.27 To that end,
the Diplock Commission recommended modifications of criminal pro-
cedure and enhanced powers for the army and the police in Northern
Ireland.28 Its principal recommendation was the suspension of jury
trial for terrorist-type offenses.29 The Diplock Commission also recom-
mended relaxation of the common law rules on the admissibility of
confessions, restrictions on bail, and certain other procedural and evi-
dentiary changes.30 In the Diplock Commission's view, these modifica-
tions, while not departing from the minimum requirements of a judicial
process as laid down in article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, would enable more suspected terrorists to be tried by
the courts rather than by executive detention.
31
After one year's experience with the emergency provisions, the Gar-
diner Committee reported that the "non-jury" courts for the trial of
terrorist offenses had worked well.32 Though the Committee endorsed
detention without trial as a last resort, it proposed radical alterations in
the system of detention.33 These proposals were, in the main, accepted
by the Government and enacted in 1975, although the detention provi-
sions of this legislation have never been used. Since the introduction of
the non-jury (Diplock) courts, over 8000 persons have been prosecuted
for a range of crimes involving murders, causing explosions, shootings,
and membership in unlawful associations. Currently over 300 persons
are serving life sentences in Northern Ireland for murder arising out of
the political violence. 34
There have been two distinct but overlapping phases in security pol-
icy: (1) from 1971 through 1975, detention without trial with a preemi-
nent role for military action; and (2) since 1975, reliance on a criminal
HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD. 5,
No. 5847 (1975) (Lord Gardiner, Chairman) [hereinafter GARDINER REPORT].
26. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 24, at 34; GARDINER REPORT, supra note 25, at 22.
27. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 24, at 31; GARDINER REPORT, supra note 25, at 20.
28. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 24, at 30.
29. Id at 17-19.
30. Id at 32.
31. Id
32. GARDINER REPORT, supra note 25, at 16-17.
33. Id at 43.
34. K. BOYLE, SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 85-86 (1983).
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prosecution policy with a reduced role for the military and a corre-
spondingly greater role for police forces. By the end of 1975 all persons
who had been interned without trial had been released and no one has
subsequently been interned. In both phases, a stark contrast appears
between the judicial scrutiny available in international tribunals and
the impotence of the common law courts, as the following three case
studies of particular security measures make clear.
A. Interrogation Powers and Abuses
Information or intelligence is a key factor in a conflict with armed
and secret groups. It is no accident that in insurgencies generally the
central area of complaint surrounds the interrogation room and the
methods used to obtain information from those arrested. Northern Ire-
land has proved to be no exception. What is perhaps a greater indict-
ment of the system than the ill-treatment of detainees has been the
failure of government and the law to establish effective safeguards to
prevent repetition of serious abuses.
In Northern Ireland the history of ill-treatment involves both mili-
tary and police personnel and extends to efforts to gather intelligence
and police efforts to translate such intelligence into evidence in the
form of confession statements which could be produced in court.35
Following the introduction of internment in Northern Ireland on a
large scale in 1971, the security forces faced numerous allegations of
torture and brutality in the treatment of internees. A Committee of
Enquiry was established by the British government and it verified
many of the allegations. 36 In particular the Committee confirmed that
"interrogation in depth" had been undertaken in a number of cases.
This process consisted of covering suspects' heads with black hoods for
long periods, exposing them to continuous and monotonous noise of a
kind calculated to make any communication impossible, making them
stand against the wall with their legs apart and hands raised against the
wall for continuous periods of six or seven hours at a time, and finally
depriving them of food and sleep. In the wake of these findings the
government established another committee to advise on the future use
of these interrogation procedures. 37 This committee advised that the
35. See P. TAYLOR, BEATING THE TERRORISTS? (1980).
36. REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES OF
PHYSICAL BRUTALITY ARISING OUT OF EVENTS ON THE 9TH AUGUST 1971, CMD. 5, No.
4823 (1971).
37. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER
AUTHORISED PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERROR-
ISM, CMD. 5, No. 4901 (1971).
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procedures were illegal, but the majority approved of their continued
use "on moral grounds," considering that tough measures were justified
to obtain information. The government, however, followed the minor-
ity report that condemned the techniques and announced that, while
interrogation in depth would continue, the specific techniques con-
demned as illegal would not be used.
38
Largely because of the use of the sensory deprivation technique and
because of the scale of the complaints of ill-treatment, the Irish govern-
ment in December, 1971 invoked the European Convention on Human
Rights, alleging widespread violation of article 3, which prohibits tor-
ture, inhuman, and degrading treatment. The Irish government also
complained of violations of articles 5 and 6 in respect of detention
without trial and of article 14 in that detention had been applied with
discrimination as between republican and loyalist suspects.39 The Eu-
ropean Commission found that the five techniques of sensory depriva-
tion constituted torture, ° a finding changed by the European Court to
one of inhuman treatment. 4' The Court, however, confirmed the Com-
mission's finding that at one interrogation center in the autumn of
1971, there had been an administrative practice of ill-treatment in vio-
lation of article 3, and that this practice had been tolerated at the level
of the government itself.
42
The painstaking and lengthy investigation into the facts undertaken
by the Commission stands in striking contrast to the role of the domes-
tic common law courts and the Committees of Enquiry. Indeed, the
Commission rejected the reasoning of both internal inquiries men-
tioned above.43 The sensory deprivation procedures had been justified
by their results.44 The Commission rejected this view, citing the com-
mon article 3 of both the Geneva Convention and the European Con-
vention.45 It ruled that the prohibition under article 3 of the European
Convention is an absolute one and there can never be, under the Con-
vention or under international law, a justification for acts in breach of
38. Prime Ministerial Statement of Mar. 2, 1972, explained in Ireland v. United King-
dom, [1978] 2 E.H.H.R. 25 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
39. See O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on
Human Rights: Ireland v. United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1977).
40. Report of the European Commission on Human Rights (Ireland v. United King-
dom), 1976-78 E.C.H.R., ser. B, vol. 23-I, at 390.
41. Ireland v. United Kingdom, [1978] 2 E.H.R.R. 55-57 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
42. Id
43. Report of the European Commission on Human Rights, supra note 40, at 390.
44. See id at 144-52.
45. Id at 390.
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that provision.46 These proceedings, and other petitions by individuals
complaining of ill-treatment, clearly illustrate the impotence of re-
course to a remedy outside the state, where the actions of the state's
security forces are being complained of and where these actions are
condoned or ignored by government
The Convention, however, is not a remedy of first instance. The real
significance of the findings in Ireland v. United Kingdom concerning ill-
treatment in police or military custody was the emphasis placed by the
Commission and Court on the inadequacy of remedies during the pe-
riod it was examining.47 The Commission expressed particular concern
about the failure to carry out internal police inquiries and to prosecute
or discipline those found guilty of misconduct.48 In subsequent cases
the Commission accepted the evidence that complaints had been inves-
tigated at the domestic level as proof that ill-treatment was not con-
doned or authorized, even though few prosecutions or disciplinary
actions resulted from such investigations.
49
The adequacy of these internal police investigations accepted by the
Commission must be doubted. The experience in Northern Ireland
throughout the 1970's has been that such investigation achieved very
little and did not prevent the continuation of complaints of violence to
prisoners in custody. While some of these complaints may be assumed
to have been false and alleged for propaganda effect, many were true.
The vulnerability of prisoners to abuse and of the police force to false
allegations were inevitable consequences of emergency arrest powers
which permitted detention for questioning for three or seven days de-
pending on the power used with little or no concern for safeguards.
During such periods there was no requirement to bring the arrestee
before a court, and the interrogators had an exclusive right of access.5 0
The context of these allegations also included the changes in the rules
of evidence governing admissibility of confessions. The defense be-
came obliged to establish prima facie evidence of "torture inhuman or
degrading treatment" before the prosecution was required to rebut such
evidence. The prosecution was not required to establish that any incul-
patory admissions were voluntarily made. The new test on the admissi-
bility of confessions was taken from the language of article 3 of the
European Convention and illustrates the minimum nature of the Con-
46. See id
47. Ireland v. United Kingdom, [1978] 2 E.H.R.R. 93-97 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
48. Report of the European Commission on Human Rights, supra note 40, at 377-90.
49. Donnelley v. United Kingdom, 4 Decisions & Reports (1976).
50. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO
NORTHERN IRELAND 55, 67 (1978) (AI Index EUR 45/01/78).
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vention's guarantees. In practice, the test encouraged ill-treatment, as
was acknowledged by the Bennett Committee.51 It is to be
remembered that the main security strategy at this period was to prose-
cute through the courts and that eight out of ten prosecutions relied on
confessions taken during interrogation.
5 2
Following an Amnesty International mission in 1977, which con-
cluded that ill-treatment of suspects by the police force had taken place
with sufficient frequency to warrant an inquiry, the government was
forced to react.5 3 It established the Bennett Committee, without au-
thority to investigate the complaints directly, to examine interrogation
procedures and the procedures for making complaints against the po-
lice.54 The Bennett Committee endorsed self-policing by the security
forces.5 5 While recommending that a suspect ought to have access to a
solicitor after forty-eight hours in police custody, it refrained from rec-
ommending earlier access to a solicitor and specifically rejected a pro-
posal that a solicitor should be present during questioning by the
police.56 The value of access to a lawyer after forty-eight hours is se-
verely limited, for research has shown that most of those arrested will
have already made statements or confessions during the first two days.
In addition, it appears that access was permitted only in the presence of
a police officer.
The numerous other recommendations made by the Bennett Com-
mittee, including a virtual ban on interrogations at night, the monitor-
ing of interrogation cells by closed-circuit television, and proper
training for interrogators, will improve the safeguards for those ar-
rested under the emergency powers. Most of these recommendations
have been implemented, and there have been few complaints of ill-
treatment during interrogation by the police since the implementation
of the Bennett Report. But, whatever the efficacy of these measures in
supervising interrogation and complaint processes, they do not inter-
fere with the autonomy of police in interviewing suspects.5 7 Genuine
controls on interrogation cannot be self-policed as is attempted in the
Bennett reform. Physical abuse of prisoners will only be eliminated
51. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION IN NORTH-
ERN IRELAND, CMD. 5, No. 7497 at para. 84 (1979) (His Honor H.G. Bennett, Chairman)
[hereinafter BENNETT REPORT].
52. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 5, at 44-46.
53. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 50, at 26.
54. BENNETT REPORT, supra note 51.
55. Id at 14.
56. Id at 125-26.
57. For a study of the implementation of the Bennett Report safeguards, see Walsh,
Arrest and Interrogation: Northern Ireland 1981, 9 J. LAw & Soc. 37 (1982).
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when there is a judicially enforceable code of conduct whose breach is
sanctioned by the exclusion of a confession statement tendered as evi-
dence in a trial.58
Finally, it must be recalled that in 1975 when the rules governing the
admissibility of statements were changed through legislation based on
recommendations of the Diplock Commission, little or no thought was
given to the creation of safeguards to match the greater ease with which
confessions would be admitted. It took a further six years to address
the question of safeguards and to attempt to provide them. In all
probability, the loss of confidence, particularly by the minority commu-
nity, in the administration of criminal justice as a result of numerous
cases of ill-treatment over this six-year period damaged security goals
more than the easing of the constraints on interrogation and the prose-
cution of persons through the courts aided those goals.
B. The Hunger Strikes and the Impotence of a Legal System
If the major controversy over security and human rights in the 1970's
concerned the interrogation centers, the prisons became the location of
local and ultimately worldwide concern in 1980 and 1981. The grue-
some contest between I.R.A. H-Block prisoners and the British govern-
ment over whether the prisoners were to be labelled convicts or
political offenders had traumatic effects on both the prison and the
outside community.59 Ten prisoners died on hunger strike and at least
fifty people were killed in associated protest and violence during the
strikes. The ultimate collapse of the hunger strike proved a pyrrhic
victory for the British Conservative government. The large vote cast
for I.R.A. candidates in the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly elections
demonstrated the minority community's sympathy for the hunger strik-
ers and its anger at what it considered government intransigence. Hav-
ing been denied political status in the prisons, the I.R.A. secured a
measure of legitimacy through the ballot box. While the implications
of the political significance of the I.R.A.'s having five elected represent-
atives in Northern Ireland remain unclear, such electoral success repre-
sents an ominous development for those who seek a peaceful resolution
of the conflict.
The origins of the prison dispute can be traced to an earlier phase of
security policy when internment without trial was used on a large scale.
58. For a model of one possible interrogation code, see TEN YEARS ON, supra note 5, at
110-12.
59. The term H-Block derives from the layout of the Maze Prison. For an analysis of the
prison crisis, see TEN YEARS ON, supra note 5, at 88-97.
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From the introduction of internment in 1971, detainees were not
treated as convicted prisoners but were given a status similar to that of
prisoners awaiting trial. They were entitled to wear their own clothes,
were released from prison labor, and had generous visiting and corre-
spondence privileges. In addition, they were granted a considerable
degree of autonomy in organizing their affairs. They had, in a word,
something akin to prisoner of war treatment. From June, 1972, this
treatment was extended to convicted prisoners who had been found
guilty of terrorist-type offenses and it became known as "special cate-
gory status." As detention without trial was phased out in 1975 and
detainees were released, pressure mounted for the abolition of special
category status. Because the emphasis of security policy was now to
bring those involved in violence before the courts, it was considered a
contradiction of that policy to confer a special status on those who
claimed political motivation for their offenses.
60
In 1976 the authorities moved to change the policy with a combina-
tion of carrot and stick. It was announced that all of those convicted
through the Diplock courts would no longer be entitled to a special
regime but would have to conform to the prison rules as they applied to
other prisoners. The major and immediate implications were that all
prisoners would be required to wear prison uniforms and to engage in
prison work. The inducement to conform to the changes came in the
form of a generous remission of sentences. A conforming prisoner
could expect to be released after having served one-half of his sentence.
Nevertheless, many convicted of terrorist offenses did not conform.
Refusing to wear a prison uniform and not being permitted their own
clothes, they remained naked. Their refusal to work resulted in disci-
plinary measures, including confinement in their cells and withdrawal
of privileges. As the prisoners continued to refuse to conform, the dis-
ciplinary sanctions were also continued, and stalemate resulted. The
decision to go on hunger strike was the final action taken in this pro-
tracted struggle over symbols and labels. To I.R.A. prisoners, the deci-
sion to remove special privileges was rightly seen as part of a larger
attempt to change the public perception of them from politically moti-
vated to criminally motivated offenders, and hence to deny them the
legitimacy they claimed for their violent campaign.
Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of the hunger strike crisis was
the non-involvement of the municipal legal system in its resolution.
60. See GARDINER REPORT, supra note 25, at 22 (strong criticism of special category
status and plea for abolition).
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Because punishments imposed on the prisoners were within prison
rules, there was no possibility for intervention. Questions as to the pro-
portionality of the authorities' official response to the recalcitrant pris-
oners could not be raised.
The European Commission of Human Rights, however, was again
involved. In McFeeley and Six Others v. United Kingdom, the appli-
cants complained of their conditions and claimed that their treatment
by the authorities violated their rights under the European Conven-
tion.6' After a detailed examination of the facts and the law, the Com-
mission dismissed the bulk of the complaint. The proceedings,
however, were important despite the rejection of the prisoners' case.
The Commission did not hold that the case was inadmissible on
grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the basis for rejection
of most complaints brought before it. It confirmed the applicants' plea
that no adequate or effective remedies existed at the domestic level.
Lack of any possibility of ventilating complaints through the courts
of Northern Ireland provides a further illustration of the limitations on
remedies in the United Kingdom. Had local courts possessed jurisdic-
tion to consider the prisoners' central claim that the authorities' re-
sponse to their non-conformity was disproportionate and cruel there
might well have been no crisis. Without denying the difficulties in-
volved, it ought to have been possible to arrive at a modus vivendi
which ensured minimum rights for the protesting prisoners without
compromising the security of the prison or the declared policies of the
government. Judicial intervention might at least have induced the gov-
ernment to adopt a more flexible approach.
The Commission of Human Rights did express concern "at the in-
flexible approach of the State authorities which has been concerned
more to punish offenders against prison discipline than to explore ways
of resolving such a serious deadlock. '62 When the hunger strike actu-
ally commenced in March, 1981, the Commission took an active part in
attempting to resolve it. A Commission delegation made a publicized
visit to the prison to determine if the first hunger striker, Bobby Sands,
M.P., wished to proceed with an application that had been lodged on
his behalf. This intervention failed, but the Commission continued its
involvement. When the British government waived its objection to ad-
missibility of the surviving complaints in the McFeeley case, the Com-
mission exercised its jurisdiction to assist in friendly settlement under
61. Application No. 8317/78, Partial Decision of the Commission on Admissibility,
[1980] 3 E.H.R.R. 161 (Eur. Comm'n of Human Rights).
62. Id at 203.
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article 28 of the Convention following admission of the case. Strenu-
ous effort to negotiate a resolution through the good offices of the Com-
mission ultimately came to naught, but the process contributed to
clarification of the issues in contention between the hunger strikers and
the prison authorities. After ten prisoners had died, the hunger strike
collapsed in October, 1981.
A full account of the prison crisis remains to be written, but a suffi-
cient account has been given here to illustrate the contrast between the
active role of an international human rights agency and the inactive
and, indeed, impotent role of the domestic courts.
C. Lethal Force and the Right to Life
Perhaps it is in the nature of a protracted emergency, particularly
one as violent as that in Northern Ireland, that one human rights con-
cern replaces another. If ill-treatment of suspects under interrogation
dominated the 1970's and if 1980-1981 were the years of the hunger
strikes, the issue which is currently prominent is killings by the security
forces. In December, 1982 and January, 1983 nine people were shot
dead by the police in circumstances which appear prima facie unjustifi-
able. In only one of these recent incidents were the targets armed-two
youths were handling a pair of antiquated unloaded rifles which they
had found-when the police shot them. As a result of these and earlier
incidents, there have been claims by opposition leaders that a policy of
"shoot to kill" is now being adopted. The police and government au-
thorities strenuously deny this claim.
63
Although the recent killings have resulted from the use of conven-
tional bullets, another controversy has raged over deaths due to plastic
and rubber bullets ("baton rounds"). The rubber bullet was first intro-
duced in 1970 as a substitute for conventional arms in riot control.
Subsequently, it was replaced by a similar projectile made of plastic for
greater accuracy in firing. The plastic bullet is about four inches long
and an inch and a half in diameter. It is fired from a riot gun with a
muzzle velocity of over 160 miles per hour. Regulations specify that it
should not be used at a range of less than twenty meters. While the
authorities' intention in arming the security forces with an alternative
weapon was to avoid disproportionate injuries and killings, the weapon
chosen has proved to have lethal potential. Fourteen people, seven
adults and seven children, have been killed by both plastic and rubber
bullets in the last twelve years, and another sixty have suffered serious
63. Irish Times, Dec. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 1; The Guardian, Dec. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
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permanent injury.6" While civil claims for damages have been pursued
successfully in some cases and there have been some prosecutions aris-
ing from the use of lethal force by the security forces, no member has
been convicted or imprisoned as a result.
It is important that the conditions within which the security forces
are operating are made clear. Interpol has calculated that members of
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Northern Ireland police force, face
higher risks of being murdered than any other police force in the world.
They have, for example, a fifty per cent greater chance of being mur-
dered than do the police in El Salvador.65 The killings of soldiers and
police do not occur incidental to some other crime, as in situations else-
where, but they are the purpose of the crime itself.
In these circumstances of pervasive danger, the law protects neither
the security forces nor civilians. The sole provision governing the cir-
cumstances in which force, including deadly force, may lawfully be
used by the security forces in Northern Ireland, is contained in section
3 of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland), 1967, which provides
that "[a] person may use such force as is reasonable in the circum-
stances in the prevention of crime or in effecting the lawful arrest of
offenders unlawfully at large."
This codification of what was assumed to be the common law de-
rived from the Criminal Law Revision Committee's report of 1965.66
The Committee had considered whether it should specifically prescribe
conditions for the use of lethal force but decided against doing so be-
cause it imagined that such circumstances would rarely arise and that
the criteria to be applied could safely be left for development by judi-
cial decision.67
The Committee's sanguine view has not been borne out. The police
in both England and Northern Ireland have used firearms with increas-
ing frequency and the common law courts have not developed rules
governing the use of lethal force. The result is an almost entirely un-
regulated discretion subject only to a general standard which is, inevi-
tably, imprecise. The failure to regulate the circumstances in which
soldiers and police may legitimately shoot to kill has undoubtedly con-
tributed to the controversies surrounding such killings in Northern Ire-
land. Indeed, it could be said that the imprecision in the law has
64. Shallice, The Harmless Bullett That Kills, NEW STATESMAN, Aug. 14, 1981, at 6.
65. See Foley, Public Security and Individual Freedom: The Dilemma of Northern Ire-
land, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 284, 289-90 (1982).
66. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (FELO-
NIES AND MISDEMEANORS) (1965).
67. See Id
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resulted in deaths or serious injuries that might have been prevented if
it had been possible to ensure accountability for the use of deadly force.
The lack of guidelines frequently has been criticized by the security
forces themselves, particularly in connection with duties to disperse ri-
oters.68 It is true that soldiers and police are issued instructions (the
"yellow card") on when and when not to shoot. However, these in-
structions have no status in law and juries have been told to ignore
them when considering questions of civil or criminal liability.
69
The courts have had opportunities to provide guidance which, al-
though less satisfactory than statutory standards, could have filled an
important need. Although few prosecutions have arisen from the use
of deadly force, some of the circumstances of the killings have ap-
peared so lacking in any apparent justification that failure to prosecute
would have led to public outrage. One of the more notorious incidents
concerned the killing by a soldier of a young farmhand in a rural dis-
trict of Northern Ireland in 1975. The victim had just been questioned
by the soldier and was permitted to go. He was not armed and was
wearing heavy wading boots-when he began to walk across a field. The
soldier, who apparently had a fresh suspicion that the farmhand might
be an I.R.A. man, called on him to halt. The youth allegedly began to
run and the soldier shot him. The farmhand was not a member of the
I.R.A. The soldier was subsequently acquitted of murder. The prose-
cution sought a ruling on the questions raised by the case by referring it
under established procedures to the appeal courts. Such a reference
does not permit reversal of the acquittal but enables the courts to pre-
vent an error in law from becoming a precedent. The House of Lords,
which ultimately heard the case, refused to give the necessary guidance
on the use of lethal force.70 The court held that all issues arising from
this case and similar cases were issues of fact for the jury. It was for the
jury in any case to say what was or was not reasonable force in the
particular circumstances. The House of Lords persisted in this refusal
to offer guidance on the use of deadly force in the Farrell case, which
also had been appealed by the state authorities for the specific purpose
of clarifying the law.
71
These decisions leave the courts open to the charge that they have
denied justice. Not the least consequence of this situation is to make it
68. See R. EVELEGH, PEACE-KEEPING IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY-THE LESSONS OF
NORTHERN IRELAND (1978).
69. Regina v. Naughton, 1975 N. Ir. 203, 206, 208.
70. Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference, 1976 N. Ir. 169.
71. Farrell v. Secretary of State, [1980] 1 All E.R. 166; 1980 N. Ir. 55.
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extremely difficult for a prosecutor to bring future cases. In Northern
Ireland the office of prosecutor, the Director of Public Prosecutions, has
compounded the problem by not giving reasons for a failure to prose-
cute. This produces the unacceptable result that the public is left to
draw the inference that deaths of seemingly innocent people were con-
sidered justifiable homicides by the authorities. Such a perception can
only exacerbate tensions and increase violence, since no one could rea-
sonably regard the killing of seven children by baton rounds as
justifiable.
The problem requires judicial scrutiny and legislation to protect
lives. In light of the themes in this paper it will not be surprising that
the judicial scrutiny denied within the United Kingdom is occurring
instead under the European Convention on Human Rights. On De-
cember 10, 1982, the Commission of Human Rights admitted the Far-
rell case under article 2, which protects the right to life.72 The central
argument in Farrell is that the standards applied in the trial deriving
from the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland), 1967, section 3, do not
correspond to the requirements of article 2 of the European
Convention.
Conclusion
The concept of an emergency gives rise to the expectation that such a
state of affairs is temporary and that normal conditions will be restored.
In Northern Ireland, however, there can be no such expectation. The
duration of the conflict, the impact of the violence, and the measures
taken to respond to it have left little in the society unaffected or un-
changed. Normal conditions will not be restored in Northern Ireland.
Instead, normal conditions will have to be built from the ground up.
The important questions are how much longer it will take the work of
construction to begin and at what costs in terms of human life.
The debate continues in Northern Ireland as elsewhere in the United
Kingdom as to how best to safeguard rights and whether the perma-
nent securing of individual and minority rights is best promoted by the
succession of ad hoc measures and agencies already created, or requires
further protection in a Bill of Rights. 73 But what is now clearly ac-
cepted by all government authorities is that modern standards of demo-
cratic government require a greater significance to be given to the
72. Farrell v. United Kingdom, No. 9013/80 (Eur. Comm'n of Human Rights) (filed
Dec. 15, 1982).
73. J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS (1980).
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protection through law of individual and minority rights than has oc-
curred in the past, especially in a community so deeply divided as
Northern Ireland. In practical terms, the most effective mode of pro-
tection would result from the incorporation of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights into the domestic law of Northern Ireland.74
The Republic of Ireland has a written constitution with explicit provi-
sion for judicial review, and has experienced little difficulty in recon-
ciling the common law traditions with a constitution which protects
fundamental rights.75 But the prospects for political resolution would
be enhanced if in addition the Convention was also made directly en-
forceable in the courts of the Republic of Ireland.
Should a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland be legislated now, it
would be necessary to suspend at least some of its provisions. Limita-
tions of human rights, after all, will persist as long as the underlying
political and social issues remain unresolved.
There are indications that both the Republic of Ireland and the
United Kingdom have come to recognize that the primary responsibil-
ity for settlement lies with them. The most positive reflection of this
awareness has been the beginnings of an institutional relationship be-
tween the two states. These developments stem from meetings in 1980
between the British Prime Minister and the Irish Taoiseach. They
agreed to initiate policies "(i) to achieve peace, reconciliation and sta-
bility and (ii) to improve relations between the peoples of the two coun-
tries."'76 A joint working group of officials was established to examine
"the totality of relationships within these islands," and find means of
expressing the "unique relationship" between the two countries. 77 The
working groups have envisaged an intergovernmental council, a secre-
tariat, and an inter-parliamentary body. The Republic of Ireland
urged that the latter should include representatives from Northern Ire-
land. Cooperation across a broad spectrum of activities was also
advocated.
Progress along these desirable lines has not yet been much in evi-
dence. The Falklands war, in which Ireland failed to back the British
on grounds of neutrality, and the British government's initiative in es-
tablishing a new elected assembly within Northern Ireland in 1982
without consulting the Republic, have left relations between the gov-
74. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 14.
75. Costello, Rights of Accused Persons and the Irish Constitution of 1937, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 165 (J. Andrews ed. 1982).
76. ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES REPORTS 11-12 (1981).
77. Id at 13-18.
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ernments in a cool and, until recently, almost unfriendly state. One
may nevertheless predict that the worsening situation in Northern Ire-
land, and the urgency of joint political, economic, and security policies
to halt the deterioration will result in closer relations in the future. A
beginning could be made by making the protections of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which has proved so valuable over the
last decade of strife, directly available to the populations on the island
by its incorporation into the domestic laws on both sides of the border.
This incorporation is especially important because it appears that for
the foreseeable future in Ireland there is likely to be a minority popula-
tion where it would prefer not to be-whether a Catholic nationalist
minority in the North or a Protestant Unionist minority in a united
Ireland. Under these conditions the theme that most needs develop-
ment now is the theme of protection of human rights and minorities.
